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The global financial crisis of 2008/09 has reminded both policymakers and
academics of the powerful effect of sudden changes in the direction of capital flows.
A tightening of borrowing constraints was an important contributor to these sudden
changes and forced many borrowers into rapid deleveraging. Based on their experi-
ence in the 1990s, a number of emerging market economies had prepared for such
shocks by accumulating foreign reserves. This dissertation analyzes the effects of
such credit shocks and the optimal precautionary response in emerging economies.
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction that motivates the topic and overviews main
results of the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 takes the view of a small open economy. It develops a formal model
of why emerging markets simultaneously hold external debt and external reserves.
Reserves may be held simultaneously with debt even when their return is lower
because they are valuable for self-insurance. Two key assumptions generate this
finding. First, the economy may experience a sudden stop in its access to new foreign
debt issuance. Second, debt has longer maturity than reserves. When a sudden
stop occurs, the maturity difference allows the agent to repay the debt gradually,
giving a liquidity advantage to reserves. I numerically show that the model economy
optimally chooses simultaneous holding for most periods. The model also generates
contrasting responses of reserves to the sudden stop shock and the endowment shock,
consistent with the data.
Chapter 3 takes the view of a firm in an emerging economy. It investigates
the relationship between credit shocks and firm financing patterns. After empiri-
cally establishing that banking crises are followed by stagnation in credit and that
investment is financed less by debt and more by internal fund or equity at the time
of banking crises, I develop a dynamic model of the firm consistent with this finding.
In the model, the firm increases its reliance on retained earnings or equity issuance
in response to a negative credit shock. In the long-run distribution, the introduction
of a credit shock leads to a lower average debt and higher volatility in equity payout,
debt, and capital. An extended period of negative credit shocks leads to a creditless
recovery where investment is financed not by debt but by retained earnings or equity
issuance.
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The global financial crisis of 2008/09 has reminded both policymakers and
academics of the powerful effect of sudden changes in the direction of capital flows.
A tightening of borrowing constraints was an important contributor to these sudden
changes and forced many borrowers into rapid deleveraging. Based on their experi-
ence in the 1990s, a number of emerging market economies had prepared for such
shocks by accumulating foreign reserves. This dissertation analyzes the effects of
such credit shocks and the optimal precautionary response in emerging economies.
1.1 Small Open Economies and Credit Shocks
Chapter 2 models a small open economy. Distinct features of this model are
that it distinguishes between external reserves and external debt, and that the model
includes an exogenous credit shock. I use this model to analyze external balance
sheet adjustments of a small open economy. An important result is that the model
can rationalize that emerging market economies simultaneously hold external re-
serves and external debt. The simultaneous holding of exernal reserves and external
debt is a prominent feature of external balance sheets of emerging markets (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), yet it is a puzzle because given the interest rate difference
between the saving interest and borrowing interest rate it is costly (Rodrik, 2006
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and Stiglitz, 2006). The chapter shows that two assumptions are crucial to generat-
ing this simultaneous holding result. First, the economy may experience a sudden
stop in its access to new foreign debt issuance. Second, debt has longer maturity
than reserves. Under these assumptions, when a sudden stop occurs, the maturity
difference allows the agent to repay the debt gradually, giving a liquidity advantage
to reserves. I calibrate the model to a sample of emerging markets and compare
the model performance to the data. The model economy optimally chooses simul-
taneous holding for most periods. The model also generates contrasting responses
of reserves to the sudden stop shock and the endowment shock, consistent with the
data. Reservers decrease sharplly in response to a sudden stop shock, but it does
not in response to a negative endowment shock.
1.2 Firms and Credit Shocks
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of credit shock on firm’s choice of investment,
debt issuance, and equity payout. First the chapter shows stylized facts on the re-
lationship between business cycle and credit. Using aggregate data I confirm that
banking crisis incidence leads to stagnant credit developments in the subsequent
years. At the firm level, I show that firms that are located in the countries that are
experiencing banking crises tend to rely less on bank financing and more on other
sources, such as retained earnings or equity issuance. Using a firm level survey for
a broad range of emerging markets and developing economies, I show that firms
experiencing banking crises have lower proportion of bank financing and higher pro-
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portion of equity financing/owner’s self financing of fixed asset investment. Then I
use a dynamic model of the firm consistent with these stylized facts. Main departure
from existing models is that the credit shock is included. I show analytical results on
substitution of financing sources in response to a credit shock. Simulated long-run
distribution of the firm shows that the introduction of the credit shock leads to a
much lower average debt and higher volatility in equity payout, debt, and capital. I
also show that that the firm can recover its output after the initial shock in response
to extended periods of negative credit shocks. Thus this model can replicate “cred-
itless recovery” phenomenon, a recovery in output after financial crises without an
accompanying recovery in credit, observed for both emerging markets and industrial
economies but especially strong for the former.
3
Chapter 2
Sudden Stops and External Balance Sheet Management in Emerging
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Emerging market economies simultaneously hold external reserves and external
debt. Figure 2.1 shows the reserves to GDP ratio and gross debt to GDP ratio for
15 emerging market economies in 2007.1 All countries hold a substantial level of
reserves while retaining a positive level of debt. This appears to be an inefficient
use of resouces because emerging markets generally face higher borrowing interest
rates than lending interest rates in the international financial market.
Academic literature has paid a lot of attention to the asset side of emerg-
ing markets’ external balance sheet, i.e. the surge in international reserves.2 The
concurrent question of why they accumulate reserves and debt simultaneously has
been less explored and has not been formally modeled, however.3 Rodrik (2006) and
Stiglitz (2006) point out that the accumulation of low-yielding international reserves
1The sample consists of countries that experienced the sudden stop of capital flows in the 1990’s
and early 2000’s, excluding Hong Kong. This sample is used later in the quantitative analysis.
The appendix lists data sources.
2An incomplete list includes Aizenman and Lee (2007), Rodrik (2006), Durdu, Mendoza, and
Terrones (2009), Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010), Jeanne (2007), Jeanne and Ranciere
(2009), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), and
Devereux and Sutherland (2009), and Korinek and Luis (2010).
3One of the only papers that attempt to study the simultaneous holding of the reserves and
external debt is Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). In their model, the distinction between reserves and
debt is default risk. They find that it is never optimal to hold reserves and debt simultaneously,
contradicting the evidence presented in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Emerging Markets’ Reserves and Gross External Debt
by emerging markets entails large opportunity costs, but do not rationalize it by a
formal model. The vast majority of open economy models do not make a distinction
between reserves and debt but track only net foreign assets. I take a first step in
modeling this simultaneous holding.
I study a small open economy that models differences between reserves and
external debt in the emerging markets. First, I assume that the economy’s ability to
issue new debt may suddenly be lost exogenously (henceforth called a sudden stop).
This assumption captures experiences of emerging market countries that suffered
the sudden stop of external capital inflows. Second, I assume that reserves have
shorter maturity than debt. This assumption captures the fact that a large part of
emerging markets’ reserves are held in the form of U.S. Treasury debts, which have
a deep and liquid secondary market that continues to function even during financial
5
crises.4
These assumptions motivate the economy to hold reserves alongside debt for
liquidity purposes. When an economy incurs the sudden stop, it cannot smooth
consumption by issuing new external debt. Having set aside reserves in advance is
beneficial in this context. On the one hand, the economy can repatriate both princi-
pal and interest from the reserves even during the sudden stop. On the other hand,
only a fraction of existing debt stock has to be repaid each period. Thus reserves
holding financed by debt creates a source of self-insurance against the sudden stop
because of the difference in maturities between the reserves and debt. This reserve
accumulation can be interpreted as holding of an asset with high market liquidity
as insurance against debt with an occasional funding liquidity problem.5
I find that my model generates simultaneous holding of reserves and debt in
equilibrium. The model’s decision rule is similar to the standard model when the
optimal portfolio choice results in a strong net foreign asset position. In this case,
the agent chooses zero debt and generates positive reserves. When the optimal
portfolio choice results in a weak net foreign asset position, however, the decision
rule differs from that in the standard model. In the standard precautionary model,
the agent would choose a positive level of debt with no reserves. In my model, in
contrast, the agent would maintain reserves along with debt. Moreover, a choice
of higher debt is accompanied by higher reserve holding because higher debt risks
4Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenssen (2010) present empirical evidence on the special role
of U.S. Treasury bonds as liquidity provider.
5Market liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset an agent holds can be sold, and funding
liquidity refers to the ease with which an agent can issue new debt. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2008) and IMF (2008) for further description.
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larger capital outflow if no new borrowing is allowed next period.
For sensitivity analysis, I first vary two parameters in the model, namely, the
interest rate spread and the probability of the sudden stop. The size of the simulta-
neous holding is inversely related to the interest rate spread. A higher probability
of the sudden stop results in a higher level of reserves per unit of debt on the one
hand, but deters debt holding on the other hand because the need for higher reserves
increases the cost of debt. Second, I endogenize of the probability of the sudden
stop by making it a decreasing function of the reserve to short-term debt ratio. This
results in the optimal reserves and debt varying little compared with the benchmark
case. This result is in contrast with that in Jeanne and Ranciere (2009), who find
that the optimal reserves generally increase when the sudden stop probability is
a decreasing function of the reserve to short-term debt ratio. The reason for the
difference is because my model features occasionally-binding constraints, leading to
accumulation of reserves financed by debt issuance during non-sudden stop periods.
Comparison of numerical results from the model with data from a sample of
emerging markets provides us with a sense of the quantitative fit of the model. I
find that both the model and the data show constrasting responses to different types
of shocks. The economy uses up reserves in response to the sudden stop shock, but
does not do so in response to a low endowment shock. When I compare the size
of the responses and the ergodic distribution, however, I find that the volatility of
reserves and debt relative to endowment volatility is much higher in the model than
in the data.
The first contribution of this paper is to develop a formal model of why emerg-
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ing markets simultaneously hold external debt and external reserves. In particular,
my model generates a substantial level of simultaneous holding of reserves and debt
for reasonable parameters, the first to do so. My model also generates adjustments
of external balance sheets in response to sudden stop and endowment shocks that
are consistent with data.
2.1.1 Literature Review
This paper generates the holding of liquid, return-dominated short-term assets
by assuming different liquidity properties among assets and a liquidity shock. In this
sense, my model is closest in spirit to Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). They construct a
closed-economy general equilibrium model that endogenously generates money hold-
ing as insurance against market illiquidity of existing equity and funding illiquidity
of new equity issuance. When constraints on equity financing are sufficiently strin-
gent, entrepreneurs obtain money when they do not have investment opportunities
to be used when they have investment opportunities in the future. While their model
and mine have common characteristics as mentioned above, there are also impor-
tant differences. First, asset prices are endogenously determined and the holding of
liquidity is endogenously generated in their closed-economy setting. In my model,
the small open economy takes the price of both assets as given. The implied as-
sumption is that the emerging markets are small players in both international saving
and borrowing. Second, they limit their focus around the steady state, resulting in
an always binding constraint, whereas my study allows for an occasionally-binding
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constraint and numrically solves the problem by a global approximation method.
There are a small number of papers that model endogenous choice of multiple
assets. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) construct a small open economy model with
risk-free reserves and defautable debt. They assume that the sovereign can retain
reserves even when it defaults, giving the reserves a consumption-smoothing role
when access to new borrowing is curtailed after defaults. However, this benefit of
reserves conflicts with the incentive to repay the defaultable debt, making debt more
expensive because the probability of default increases with reserves. In the end, the
optimal choice in their model is to hold no reserves for reasonable parameter values.
Their model and mine differ in what is modeled as the difference between emerging
economies’ reserves and debt. They assume differences in default risk, while we
model differences in liquidity. Our model generates co-existence of saving and debt
for reasonable parameter values. Gamba and Triantis (2008) construct a dynamic
model of a firm that separately chooses one-period saving and issuance of a consol
bond. Their interest is in modeling optimal cash retention coexisting with debt
to obtain “financial flexibility”. Retaining cash helps the firm adjust flexibly in
response to exogenous productivity shocks when debt and equity issuance entails
transaction costs and physical capital is not perfectly irreversible. It also helps
avoiding financial distress when productivity is low and the firm is highly leveraged.
Both of these models feature a liquid asset coexisting with other assets because of the
costs and restrictions on financing with the other assets as in my model, but neither
involves a liquidity shock. Telyukova and Wright (2008) rationalize households’
simultaneous holding of liquid saving and credit card debt by extending the search
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model of money. In their model, there are three segmented markets. In addition
to the centralized Walrasian market and decentralized market with search frictions
and agents’ anonymity, which makes money essential as means of payments, there
is a third market in which there are search frictions but there is no anonymity. An
agent can make payment by either debt or money in this third market. Knowing
the future need in the decentralized market, the agent chooses to make payments by
debt and preserves money holding. As a result, money saving and debt optimally
coexist in the households’ balance sheets. While their model emphasizes market
segmentation, my model emphasizes the liquidity shock. My model could be an
alternative explanation of simultaneous holding of households’ saving and debt if
shocks to access to new borrowing are important for households’ portfolio decisions.
As stated in introduction, there is a long list of papers that studies reserve
accumulation by the emerging market economies. This study is most closely related
to those that explore the issue using a small open economy model with financial
frictions. Jeanne and Ranciere (2009) construct a stylized model in order to obtain
a formula for the optimal reserve level against sudden stops where the debt level,
insurance premium and probability of a sudden stop are exogenously given. My
model does not take the debt level as given, but jointly determines reserves and debt
while allowing for occasionally binding constraints. This feature in particular leads
to a different result than their model in the extension of the model that endogenizes
the probability of sudden stops. Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009) measure
the effect of business cycle volatility, financial globalization, and sudden stops on
reserve accumulation in the context of small open economy model with financial
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frictions. Their model tracks only net foreign assets, and their measure of reserve
accumulation is the level of precautionary saving or the difference in the level of net
foreign assets between different setups of the model. The emphasis in our model is
separation and joint determination of saving and debt.
A number of multi-country general equilibrium models, such as Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), and De-
vereux and Sutherland (2009) endogenously generate emerging market economies
holding debts issued by industrial economies. They all assume some kind of asymme-
try in financial development between industrial economies and developing economies
to obtain this result. The current study has a different focus than theirs. While they
are interested in trends of global financial imbalances due to structural properties of
domestic or international financial markets, I focus on business cycle movements by
comparing filtered data and simulation results from the model that does not include
trends.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and describes the conditions for simultaneous holding of reserves and debt. Section
3 summarizes the calibration and numerical solution method. Section 4 describes
the decision rule. Section 5 compares the model with data. Section 6 describes




The main features of our model are the following.
• There is an infinitely lived risk-averse representative agent subject to an en-
dowment shock and an exogenous shock that prohibits new borrowing.
• Agents smooth consumption using non-state contingent reserves and debt,
whose prices are determined in the international financial market.
• Debt has a longer maturity and higher return than reserves.
The model’s assumptions on the differences between reserves and debt reflect
the asymmetric environment that emerging markets’ reserves and debt face. A
substantial part of emerging markets’ reserves is invested in industrial economies’
sovereign bonds, inter alia, U.S. Treasury Bonds. The U.S. Treasury Bond market
is deep and liquid, and continues to function with low transaction costs through
times of financial crises in emerging markets. This constitutes the basis for the
different maturity assumption. Regarding the emerging market economies’s debt,
they periodically face periods in which they find it difficult to issue new bonds.
Thus my model focuses on liquidity as the distinction between the saving and debt
instruments of the emerging economies. These differences in liquidity are reflected
in the different interest rates between the reserves and the debt.6
6There is also a technical reason for the assumption of the difference in interest rates. In
the stochastic endowment economy with incomplete financial market for consumption smoothing,
assuming β(1 + rs) = 1 where rs the saving interest rate results in non-stationarity of the model.
I avoid this by assuming β(1 + rs) < 1. See Chamberlain and Wilson (2000).
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These assumptions differ from other papers. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) con-
sider default as the distinguishing feature between reserves and debt. Jeanne and
Ranciere (2009) assume that reserves are an insurance contract with net insurance
payment at the time of the sudden stop.








ct = yt + (1 + r
s)at − at+1 − (1 + r)bt + bt+1 − A (2.2)
bt+1 ≤

(1− λ)bt if bt = 0,
bh if bt = 1
(2.3)
at+1 ≥ 0 (2.4)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (2.5)
The inclusion of A, exogenously given absorption to take account of govern-
ment expenditure and investment missing in the model, follows Durdu et al. (2009).
The assumption of the interest rate spread and the need to ensure stationarity of





The exogenous shocks are modeled as the following.
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• Endowment shock
ln(y′) = ρy ln(y) + εy (2.6)




bt is a shock to access to new borrowing. It takes two values, 1 and 0. If bt = 1, the
agent can issue new debt freely subject only to conditions that are non-binding in
equilibrium, analogous to the natural debt limit modified to reflect the possibility
of sudden stop next period.7 If bt = 0, the agent cannot obtain any new borrowing.
This, however, does not mean bt+1 = 0. Only the fraction λ of the current debt
stock has to be repaid, and the agent can maintain the rest of the debt stock. We
will see that this maturity difference generates simultaneous holding of reserves and
debt. In the special case λ = 1, the two debt constraints are equivalent and the
model is reduced to the one-period debt case. In another special case to the other
direction, λ = 0, the debt is a consol bond.
7In Aiyagari (1994), a risk-averse agent that has perfect access to risk-free asset every period
faces the debt limit that ensures repayment with non-negative consumption even if the agent faces
the worst endowment indefinitely. This is called the natural debt limit. Taking into account the















)iat+i. My model requires an additional debt limit. An agent faces the debt limit
that ensures repayment with non-negative consumption even if the agent faces the worst endowment
and the sudden stop next period. This gives the debt limit bt ≤




I can recursively express the problem as the following.
V (a, b; y, b) = max
a′,b′,c
{
u(c) + βE(V (a′, b′; y′, b′)
}
(2.8)
The first-order conditions are the following.8 µ, ψ, ηa, ηb are Lagrange multi-
pliers for (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), respectively.
βEV1(a
′, b′, y′, b′)− µ+ ηa = 0 (2.9)
βEV2(a
′, b′, y′, b′) + µ+ ηb − ψ = 0 (2.10)
The envelope conditions are the following:
V1(a, b; y, b) = (1 + r
s)µ (2.11)
V2(a, b; y, b) = −(1 + r)µ+ ψI (2.12)
where I is an indicator function
I =

0 if bt = 1,
(1− λ) if bt = 0
(2.13)
8The appendix describes the detailed derivation.
15
Combining the above optimality conditions, we obtain the following.
u′(c) = β(1 + rs)Eu′(c′) + ηa (2.14)
u′(c) + (ηb − ψ) = β(1 + r)Eu′(c′)− βEψ′I ′ (2.15)
(2.14) and (3.13) are the Euler equations for reserves and debt, respectively.
Equilibrium 1. Prices {rs, r}, allocations {ct, at, bt}∞t=0 and exogenous shocks {yt, bt}∞t=0
are such that:
(i) given {rs, r} and {yt, bt}∞t=0, {ct, at, bt}∞t=0 solve the representative agent’s opti-
mization problem.
2.2.2 Characterization of Solution (Perfect Foresight Version)
I first describe the model dynamics using the perfect foresight version of the
model. I use the perfect foresight version because our results on the conditions for
the simultaneous holding of reserves and debt carry over to the stochastic version,
and because the perfect foresight version allows me to illustrate more clearly the
different portfolio adjustments with and without sudden stops.
Below I show that both the existence of the sudden stop and the maturity
difference between reserves and debt are necessary in order for the economy to
optimally choose simultaneous holding. I first show the analytical results and then
describe them in the context of a general description of the optimal decision rule.
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2.2.2.1 Endowment Shock Only
As a benchmark, suppose that there is no shock to borrowing. Then the Euler
equations are the following.
u′(ct)
βu′(ct+1)











The optimal level of reserves and debt are determined so that the effective interest
rates from (2.16) and (2.17) are equalized. The following proposition is obtained
from these Euler equations.
Proposition 1 (No simultaneous holding with endowment shock only). If
the endowment shock is the only exogenous shock, the economy never chooses to hold
reserves and debt simulataneously.
Proof. Set ηat = η
b
t = 0. Then the system of equations (2.16) and (2.17) do not have
a solution.
When there is no sudden stop shock, the simultaneous holding of reserves and
debt would just result in the opportunity cost due to rs < r without any apparent
benefit. Thus the economy never chooses it. For high wealth (high initial net assets
and high current period endowment), the economy chooses at+1 > 0, bt+1 = 0. In
this case, ηat = 0, η
b
t > 0, and the effective interest rate for the economy is r
s. For
low wealth (low initial net assets and low current period endowment), the economy
chooses at+1 = 0, bt+1 > 0. In this case, η
a
t > 0, η
b
t = 0, and the effective interest
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rate for the economy is r. Reflecting the opportunity cost of reserve holding, there
is an intermediate region in which the economy chooses at+1 = 0, bt+1 = 0. The
effective interest rate for the economy is between rs and r. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
three cases.
In the special case r = rs, the optimal portfolio is indeterminate. The model
in fact reduces to a standard saving problem. This suggests that when there is only
the endowment shock, there is little point in distinguishing between reserves and
debt.
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2.2.2.2 Introduction of Sudden Stop Shock
The Euler equations are the following.
u′(ct)
βu′(ct+1)











Again the optimal level of reserves and debt are determined so that the effective
interest rates from (2.18) and (2.19) are equalized. The following proposition is
obtained.
Proposition 2 (Simultaneous holding with binding next period sudden
stop). If λ < 1 and the economy faces both the endowment shock and the sudden
stop shock, the economy may choose to hold reserves and debt simultaneously only
if the borrowing constraint from the next period sudden stop shock is binding.
Proof. Suppose that the next period borrowing constraint is not binding. Then




t = 0, the system of equations (2.18) and (2.19)
does not have a solution. The system of equations could possibly have a solution
with ηat = η
b
t = 0 only when the third term in (2.19) is positive, which requires
ψt+1 > 0.
When the next period borrowing constraint is binding, the economy cannot
borrow as much as it would like next period. In that case, it is sometimes beneficial
for the economy to borrow in long-term debt and allocate resources to short-term
reserves. The fact that the entire reserves will be available next period while the
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debt has to be repaid only partially helps smooth consumption the next period.
The economy thus has an incentive to borrow and simultaneously save in one-period
saving as self-insurance.
Given there is a sudden stop next period, when does it actually bind? It binds
when the current period states are unfavorable, which leads the economy to choose
low net foreign assets at the start of next period. In this case, choosing at+1 = 0,
bt+1 > 0 as in the endowment shock only case could lead to a sharp decrease in
the next period consumption due to the sudden stop. Choosing at+1 > 0, bt+1 > 0
would mitigate the effect. Solutions to (2.18) and (2.19) exist for ηat = 0, η
b
t = 0 and
the effective interest rate is 1 + rs. In contrast, when the current period states allow
the economy to choose a strong net foreign asset position at the start of next period,
at+1 > 0, bt+1 = 0 continues to be optimal, as in the endowment shock only case.
Even if there is a sudden stop next period, running down the reserves is sufficient for
consumption smoothing. If the economy experiences the binding sudden stop both
in the current period and the next period, the incentive for reserve accumulation is
lessened everything else being constant. In this case, ψt > 0 implies that the relative
price of current period consumption is high, leading to an increase in the effective
interest rate in terms of (2.19). Then the system of equations (2.18) and (2.19) is
more likely to be solved by at+1 = 0, η
a
t+1 > 0 and an effective interest rate higher
than 1 + rs.
When borrowing is allowed next period or when the sudden stop shock is not
binding, the economy would not choose to simultaneously hold reserves and debt.
This is apparent because in this case the system of equations (2.18) and (2.19) again
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would not have a solution with ηat = η
b
t = 0. When the borrowing constraint does
not bind next period, allowing for partial repayment of debt does not hold any extra
value.
Even if the economy faces the risk of sudden stops, there will be no simulta-
neous holding if reserves and debt have the same maturity (λ = 1). Because the
debt does not provide a liquidity advantage during the sudden stop, there is no
incentive for the economy to maintain debt and invest in reserves at the same time.
This result confirms that both the sudden stop and the difference in maturity are
required to generate simultaneous holding.
Proposition 3 (No simultaneous holding with same maturity). If λ = 1,
there will be no simultaneous holding even if the economy faces both an endowment
shock and the sudden stop shock.
Proof. Set λ = 1. Then the system of equations (2.18) and (2.19) does not have a




I graphically illustrate and contrast results from the model with and without
sudden stop shocks. I consider a perfect-foresight economy with exogenous shocks to
endowments and to access to external borrowing. In the numerical examples below,
the economy starts with initial reserves a0 = 0.04 and initial debt b0 = 0.3. The
endowment is either yh = 1.1 or yl = 0.9. The reserve interest rate is rs = 0.032,
borrowing interest rate is r = 0.052, and β is set to satisfy β(1 + r) = 1. λ = 0.2
21
implies 20 percent of the principal of current period debt has to repaid next period.
The limit to external debt bt takes two values, 0 or 1. When debt limit = 0, no new
borrowing is allowed. The debt limit never binds in equilibrium when bt = 1. The
parameter values are similar to the benchmark calibration I describe below.
I simulate an economy that lasts T = 100 periods. The economy experiences
high endowment in t = 1 to t = 5. Then it experiences low endowment in t = 6
and t = 7. After that, it permutates a pattern of 10 periods of high endowment
and 2 periods of low endowment. In scenario 1, this completes the description of
the economy. That is, this is an endowment shock only economy. In scenario 2, the
economy also incurs a sudden stop shock when the endowment is low. I show the
first 20 periods of both scenarios in figure 2.3.
The left panels illustrate the dynamics for scenario 1. The economy deleverages
during the high endowment times between t = 1 and t = 5. When the endowment
is low in t = 6, it increases debt and further in t = 7, the second period of low
endowment. Between t = 8 and t = 17, the economy gradually decreases debt while
reserves remains at 0. In t = 18 and t = 19, the economy increases debt again
in response to the second round of low endowment. This series of balance sheet
adjustments is essentially equivalent to a standard consumption smoothing result
using a single non-state contingent asset. Notice that there is no simultaneous
holding of the reserves and debt in any period of time after the first period.
The right panels illustrate the dynamics for scenario 2. The difference from
the left panels is that when the economy experiences low endowment, it also expe-
riences loss of access to new borrowing. The economy deleverages between t = 1
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Figure 2.3: Time-series paths (left panels= endowment shock only, right panels=
both shocks)
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and t = 4 as in the left panels. Then in t = 5, one period before the economy
experiences the sudden stop, it accumulates reserves financed by new debt issuance.
Notice there is simultaneous holding of reserves and debt in this period. In t = 6,
the economy is not allowed any new borrowing, and decreases debt. It decumulates
reserves at the same time, helping smooth consumption. In t = 7, the second period
of no new borrowing, the economy decumulates the reserves completely while par-
tially decumulating debt. The complete decumulation of reserves is consistent with
Proposition 8, which states that there cannot be coexistence when the constraint on
new borrowing is not binding next period. Debt is gradually decumulated between
t = 8 and t = 16. The same pattern of coexistence and its dissapearance is repeated
between t = 17 and t = 19.
The simultaneous holding of reserves and debt helps smooth consumption, as
can be observed by the small consumption fluctuation compared to the endowment
fluctuation during sudden stops. Consumption smoothing is not perfect, however.
This is due to the positive interest rate spread. If I assume r = rs, perfect consump-
tion smoothing will be achieved.9
2.2.3 Stochastic Version
Most of the model properties in the perfect foresight version carry over to the
stochastic version. For example, one can show that propositions 7, 8, and 3 hold
in the stochastic case. I repeat the (stochastic and recursive) Euler equations and
9While there is perfect consumption smoothing in the left panels of figure 2.3, this is not a
robust result that holds for the endowment shock only economy in general. When the intertemporal
resource transfer dictate the economy to hold positive reserve holding, it chooses to disrupt allow
for fluctuation in consumption because of the opportunity cost due to β(1 + rs) < 1.
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propositions below for the sake of completeness of presentation.
u′(c)
βEu′(c′)






= 1 + r − βEψ
′I ′ − ψ + ηb
βEu′(c′)
(2.21)
Proposition 4. If the endowment shock is the only exogenous shock, the economy
never chooses to hold reserves and debt simulataneously.
Proof. Set ηa = ηb = 0 in (2.20) and (3.20). In the absence of the sudden stop
shock, ψ = 0 and Eψ′I ′ = 0. Then the system of equations (2.20) and (3.20) does
not have a solution.
Proposition 5. If λ < 1 and the economy faces both the endowment shock and the
sudden stop shock, the economy may choose to hold reserves and debt simultaneously
only if the borrowing constraint from the sudden stop shock next period binds in
expectation.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then Eψ′I ′ = 0. The system of equations (2.20) and
(3.20) would not have a solution if ηa = ηb = 0.
Proposition 6. If λ = 1, there will be no simultaneous holding even if the economy
faces both the endowment shock and the sudden stop shock.
Proof. Set λ = 1, ηa = ηb = 0. Then the system of equations (2.20) and (3.20) does
not have a solution.
A main difference from the perfect foresight case is that the probability of a
sudden stop next period is 0 < π < 1 whereas in the perfect foresight case it is either
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0 or 1. The implication is that simultaneous holding is likely to be persistent in the
stochastic case because the economy needs to take into account the possibility of
a sudden stop every period, whereas in the perfect foresight case the simultaneous
holding appears only one period before the sudden stop, and disappears immediately
after the sudden stop ends. I will show numerically that that the simultaneous
holding is indeed persistent.
2.3 Calibration
2.3.1 Parameters
Table 2.1: Calibration Parameters
Parameters Values Description
rs 0.032 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, deflated
r 0.052 Spread of 200 bp
σ 2 Standard value for risk aversion
λ 0.2 Set for duration=4 years
A 0.308 Domestic demand other than consumption
ρy 0.725 Persistence of log endowment shock
εy 0.0377 Standard deviation of log endowment shock
π 0.1 Probability of sudden stop
I calibrate the model to a sample of emerging market economies. I do this
instead of calibrating to a particular country because later we perform an experiment
that compares average behavior of sudden stop events and low output events for a
sample of emerging markets. In order to obtain a sufficient number of sudden stop
events and low output events, I need multiple emerging market economies. One
period is assumed to be a year. Table 3.7 lists the calibrated parameters.
The parameters are set so that the exogenous shock processes are set to match
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the data. Given these targets, I am interested in the adjustments of reserves and
debt.
I set rs = 0.032. I obtained this by subtracting the average annual U.S.
inflation rate from the average annual yield of 10-year Treasury bond in 2009.
There is uncertainty around the appropriate r. Many papers, including Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010), define the borrowing inter-
est rate of the emerging market economies as the sum of the risk-free interest rate
plus JP Morgan’s EMBI index that reflects default risk of sovereign debt. Figure
2.4 reports the two aggregate indices of EMBI in 1998-2010. These indices have
had very large fluctuations over time. The extremely high numbers are irrelevant
in the context of my model, because those numbers are analogous to losing access
to borrowing, and r in the model is the borrowing interest rate when the economy
has access. I set r so that the spread is close to its historical low in the benchmark
model because these data values correspond to periods with minimum default risk.
I experiment with other values of r in the sensitivity analysis.
I set λ = 0.2. This corresponds to debt duration of approximately 4 years.10
Klingen et al. (2004) report that for countries included in the EMBI global index,
average debt duration was within 3 to 4.2 years during the 1990’s. bh needs to
ensure that the economy repays the debt while maintaining positive consumption
in every state. I set bh = 2, taking into account the numerical errors caused by grid








, where ct is payment to creditor
in period t, q is the price of asset in period 0. In our model, ct = (r + λ)(1 − λ)t−1 and q = 1,






A = 0.308 is obtained from the national accounts of the countries in the sample
and the budget constraint in the model. The budget constraint at the steady state









country-by-country from national accounts into the budget constraint
obtains A for each country. Taking the average results in A = 0.308.
Exogenous shock parameters are set as follows:
• For endowment shock parameters, I fit an AR(1) process to logged and linearly
detrended real GDP for 16 emerging market economies country-by-country. I
obtain ρiy, i = 1 . . . 16 this way. The standard deviation of the innovation
is obtained as εi =
√
εiy
2(1− ρy2), where εiy is the standard deviation of the
endowment. I take the simple average of ρiy and ε
i to obtain ρy = 0.725,
ε = 0.0377.11
• The probability of a sudden stop is 0.1, as in Jeanne and Ranciere (2009).
I set corr(yt, bt) = 0.5 in order to account for the fact that the sudden stop




11I also fitted AR(1) for logged and HP-filtered cyclical components for countries in the sample
separately and took an average. I used smoothing parameter=6.25,following Ravn and Uhlig
(2002)’s recommendation for annual data. I obtained very low persistence (ρy = 0.176).
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Figure 2.4: EMBI Time Series
2.3.2 Numerical Method
We approximate the value function along the reserves and debt dimensions
using a bivariate Chebyshev polynomial. We take a 12-th order approximation for
both saving and debt, and use a complete polynomial specification in order to econ-
omize on the number of coefficients. We take 21 Chebyshev nodes in [0, bh] for both
saving and debt. An initial guess is obtained by modified value function iteration as
described in Judd (1998), linearly interpolated at the Chebyshev nodes. The choice
of the method is based on the consideration that, on the one hand, we need global
approximation of the model because there are occasionally binding constraints, but
on the other hand, we need to be mindful of the curse of dimensionality because the
distinction of saving and debt increases the number of state variables.
We construct the exogenous shocks as follows. First we correspond endowment
shock and sudden stop shock separately to N(0, 1) so that both shocks can be ex-
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pressed as a discretization of N(0, 1). On the endowment dimension, for any current






is distributed as N(0,1). We follow Tauchen (1986)
and approximate this distribution into 4 regions that correspond to the probability
of being in one of the discretized values of yj. For the shock to b, we approximate it
by dividing the cumulative distribution function of N(0, 1) into two regions b ≤ x̃
and b > x̃ where x̃ satisfies
∫ x̃
−∞ F (x)dx = πi1, i = 1, 2 and F (x) is the cumulative
distribution function for the standard normal distribution. b ≤ x̃ corresponds to
being in a sudden stop next period and b > x̃ represents not being in a sudden stop
next period.
Second, we divide the bivariate normal distribution with shock correlation γ
into 8 regions according to the approximation in the first step. The probability
density function in each region constitutes the transition probability from (yi, bi) to
(yj, bj). We repeat this for all the combinations of initial values (yi, bi). We obtain
an 8-by-8 Markov chain as a result.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Benchmark decision rule
Figure 2.5 describes the benchmark decision rule as a function of initial states.
Solid lines plot the decision rule for at as given along the x-axis, bt = 0.5, and yt = y.
In the left panels, the economy has access to foreign borrowing in the current period.
In the right panels, the economy experiences a sudden stop in the current period.
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Figure 2.5: Decision Rule
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As a preliminary step, we confirm that there is no simultaneous holding when
there is no possibility of a sudden stop. In the left panels, we also plot in dash-dot
lines the decision rule for the case of no possibility of sudden stop for comparison
purposes. The dash-dot lines show that the economy chooses either positive reserves
and no debt or no reserves and positive debt depending on the initial net asset
position, but never holds reserves and debt simultaneously.
Now let us introduce the possibility of the sudden stop. The left panels show
that the decision rule changes little from the case with no probability of sudden stop
when the initial asset position is strong, which translates to a strong net foreign asset
position next period. In this case, the existing level of reserves is sufficient to smooth
consumption if there is a sudden stop next period.
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Simultaneous holding emerges when the optimal decision rule results in a weak
net foreign asset position next period. In this case, Eψ′I ′ > 0 in (3.20) and main-
taining higher gross debt and investing in reserves will be beneficial if there is a
sudden stop next period. Compared with the case of zero sudden stop probability,
the economy maintains higher debt and simultaneously holds reserves. A higher
debt next period is accompanied by higher reserves because the higher debt ampli-
fies the effect of the negative shock when the sudden stop occurs next period. This
necessitates having higher reserves.
Consumption is higher for higher a. This is a standard result from any con-
sumption smoothing model. Also note from the right panel that consumption
sharply decreases when the sudden stop constraint is currently binding.
Moving to the right panels, the decision rule is identical to that in the left
panels where the sudden stop shock is not binding. This happens when the initial
net asset position is relatively strong, roughly corresponding to a ≥ 0.7. When the
debt limit is binding, b′ = (1−λ)b, a′ is smaller than in the left panels and becomes
0 for weaker asset position, while c is smaller than in the left panels, especially for
weak asset positions that make a′ ≥ 0 binding.
2.4.2 Ergodic distribution
Table 2.2 reports long-run moments of the model, namely, the mean and stan-
dard deviation of saving, debt, and consumption. The mean refers to the long-run
average level of each variable. The standard deviation is taken for the logged and
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Table 2.2: Ergodic Distribution
mean std corr. with endowment corr. with reserves
reserve 0.23 0.12 -0.26 1.00
debt 1.34 0.47 -0.24 0.83
consumption 0.63 0.05 0.39 -0.47
endowment 1.00 0.06 1.00 -0.26
linearly detrended version of each variable in order to ensure comparability with data
series. I obtain positive average reserves and debt in the long run, while volatilities
of reserves and debt are much larger than those of endowments or consumption,
suggesting that the economy actively adjusts both reserves and debt. The reserves
and debt are both positive in close to 100 percent of the simulation periods.
2.4.3 Sample Time Series
Figure 2.6 shows simulated time series of 100 periods. Most importantly, it
is confirmed that positive debt and reserves happen simultaneously, rather than
reserves being observed only in some periods and debt only in others. I also find
some regularities in the time series. First, when there are sudden stops, reserves
decrease sharply. Second, low endowments without sudden stops are accompanied
by an increase in both debt and reserves. I explore these properties further below.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I explore the sensitivity of numerical results to changes in inter-
est rate spreads and in the probability of sudden stops, and allow for endogenization
of the sudden stop probability.
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Figure 2.6: Sample Time Series



















2.5.1 Changes in Interest Rate Spread
I change the spread between the lending interest rate and borrowing interest
rate by changing rs. This amounts to changing the opportunity cost of insurance.
The smaller the spread, the smaller the insurance cost. Figure 2.7 shows that
the simultaneous holding of reserves and debt increases as rs increases, with both
reserves and debt higher as rs increases, as observed in the top and middle panels.
Higher coexistence results in smoother consumption, as observed in the bottom
panel of figure 2.7.
Table 2.3 and table 2.4 show that long-run average reserve accumulation in-
creases as the interest rate spread shrinks, as the lower interest rate spread means
that the opportunity cost of self-insurance is lower. This sensitivity of reserve ac-
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cumulation to the interest rate spread is consistent with the fact that reserve ac-
cumulation accelerated during 2003-2007, a period of low interest rates. While
explanations based on financial globalization and asymmetric financial development
between the developed economies and emerging markets are certainly plausible as
an explanation of reserve accumulation by the emerging markets, a simple explana-
tion based on narrowing of the interest rate spread may have also contributed. A
serious pursuit of this line of explanation requires microfoundations on the process
of sudden stops and interest rate determination, of course.
2.5.2 Changes in Sudden Stop Probability
Figure 2.8 compares the benchmark decision rules with the decision rules for
different probabilities of sudden stops. The figure shows that a higher probability
of sudden stops leads to more simultaneous holding and a higher level of reserves.
Table 2.5 and table 2.6 compute the long run moments with different prob-
abilities of sudden stops. I find that the level of reserves becomes higher as the
probability of sudden stops increases. However, the level of debt does not neces-
sarily increase with the probability of sudden stops. This can be explained as the
following. On the one hand, an increase in the probability of the sudden stop induces
the economy to hold a higher level of reserves per unit of debt. On the other hand,
the higher probability of sudden stops imply that the economy has to deleverage
more often. This contributes to lower average debt.
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Figure 2.7: Decision Rule (Different Values of rs)
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Table 2.3: Ergodic Distribution (rs = 0.042)
mean std corr. with endowment corr. with reserve
reserve 0.33 0.13 -0.13 1.00
debt 1.59 0.38 -0.24 0.76
consumption 0.63 0.05 0.48 -0.28
endowment 1.00 0.06 1.00 -0.13
Table 2.4: Ergodic Distribution (rs = 0.022)
mean std corr. with endowment corr. with reserve
reserve 0.14 0.11 -0.30 1.00
debt 1.02 0.52 -0.23 0.88
consumption 0.65 0.05 0.35 -0.53
endowment 1.00 0.06 1.00 -0.30
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Figure 2.8: Decision Rule (Different Values of π)
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Table 2.5: Ergodic Distribution (π = 0.05)
mean std corr. with endowment corr. with reserve
reserve 0.18 0.11 -0.29 1.00
debt 1.33 0.54 -0.24 0.89
consumption 0.63 0.05 0.40 -0.61
endowment 1.00 0.06 1.00 -0.29
Table 2.6: Ergodic Distribution (π = 0.2)
mean std corr. with endowment corr. with reserve
reserve 0.25 0.16 -0.19 1.00
debt 1.19 0.47 -0.22 0.85
consumption 0.64 0.06 0.39 -0.36
endowment 1.00 0.06 1.00 -0.19
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2.5.3 Endogenization of Sudden Stop Probability
The probability of sudden stop is an exogenously given constant in the baseline
scenario. In practice, however, the probability of sudden stops may be a function of
state variables.
I endogenize the probability of sudden stop as the following







where F denotes the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal
distribution and κ1 and κ2 are parameters with κ2 > 0. Thus we assume that the
probability of sudden stop follows a Probit specification and is a decreasing function
of the reserves to short term debt ratio. This specification can be found in Jeanne
(2007) and Jeanne and Ranciere (2009) and implies a crisis prevention benefit to
reserve accumulation.
In this subsection, I switch to a modified value function iteration with 55 grid
points for both reserves and debt in [0, bh]. I also reduced the number of grid points
for the endowment to just two. These changes were made to ensure convergence of
the iteration within a reasonable time. κ1 is set at F (κ1) = 0.1 in order to facilitate
comparison with the benchmark case, and I set κ2 = 0.3, the upper limit of the
estimation results from Jeanne (2007). Figure 2.9 indicates that the decision rule
changes very little when the probability of sudden stop is endogenized. This result
is contrasting to that in Jeanne and Ranciere (2009), who conclude that optimal
reserve holding increases when the probability of a sudden stop is a decreasing
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function of the reserves to short-term debt ratio, and the effect generally strengthens
as κ2 increases. The difference can be explained by the different model assumptions
during non-sudden stop periods. In their model, the borrowing constraint is always
binding, which implies a constant debt to output ratio. Thus an increase in reserves
comes at the expense of consumption. When the probability of a sudden stop is
decreasing in reserves, it is worthwhile for the economy to sacrifice some consumption
and increase reserves. In contrast, the economy does not face a binding constraint
when there are no sudden stops in my model. Thus the economy could increase
reserves by debt issuance and without sacrificing consumption. If the reserve increase
is financed by debt issuance, however, the reserves’ net contribution to consumption-
smoothing during sudden stops is smaller than when the reserves are financed by
sacrificing consumption because of the increased debt repayment obligations. Taking
also into account the costs from interest rate differences, it is not optimal for the
economy to increases reserves. Thus the endogenization of the probability of sudden
stops that follows Jeanne and Ranciere (2009) does not lead to an increase in optimal
reserves. Note that the empirical results are inconclusive. While Garcia and Soto
(2004) find that reserve accumulation decreases the probability of the sudden stops,
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), Jeanne and Ranciere (2009), and Cavallo and
Frankel (2004) do not find an effect of reserve adequacy on the probability of sudden
stops.
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Figure 2.9: Decision Rule when probabability of sudden stop is endogenously deter-
mined
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2.6 Comparison with data
In this section I compare average model responses to different types of shocks
and constrast the behavior of reserves and debt in response to different shocks.
Moreover, I compare the model properties with those of detrended data in 1981-
2007 from a sample of emerging markets.
For this purpose, I generate a 10000-period simulated time series from the
model. After discarding the first 500 periods, I construct 5-year windows of sudden
stop events and low endowment events. The windows are constructed so that the
event takes place in t = 2. Low endowment events are identified by y = ylowest
conditional on the 5-year windows not including the sudden stops. I take the simple
average of each set of 5-year periods to generate the average responses to shocks.
The results are illustrated in figure 2.10.
The left panels describe the response to endowment shocks. The debt stock
increases because the economy responds by borrowing in order to smooth consump-
tion. Reserves also increase because the higher debt stock increases the demand
for self-insurance against a possible future sudden stop. The right panels describe
the response to sudden stop shocks. The debt stock decreases by the definition of
sudden stops. Reserves decrease for consumption-smoothing purposes.
Separately, I construct 5-year periods of sudden stop shocks and low output
shocks from the data in a way that is parallel to the model. The choice of countries
and identification of sudden stop events follows Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones
(2009). Table 2.7 lists the sudden stop events. A low output shock is defined as a
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Figure 2.10: Average behavior (Model)































Figure 2.11: Average behavior (Data)































period in which output is more than one country-specific standard deviation output
below the mean. I exclude events that include the sudden stop within the 5-year
window. When there is more than one period of low output within a 5-year window,
we take the first period as the event date. Table 2.8 lists the low output events. For
both types of events, the shock cis defined as coming in t = 2. Figure 2.11 plots the
aggregate time series for both shocks.
The left panels report the time series around the low output shock. Economies
start the period with low reserves, and increase reserves while they experience low
output. Debt decreases over time, but by much less than the change in reserves.
The right panels report the time series around the sudden stop shock. Reserves
decrease sharply at the time of the sudden stop and stay at that level throughout the
period. Debt decreases more mildly throughout the sample period. I also find that
output declines sharply around the time of the sudden stop. This is not surprising
given that sudden stop shocks typically coincide with financial crises that are costly
in terms of output. Output decreases sharply one period after the sudden stop, not
in the period of the sudden stop. This is because for some countries in the list,
most notably Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, and Mexico, the dollar denominated
GDP declined sharply one year after the sudden stop due to the collapse of a fixed
exchange rate regime.
While both model and data show contrasting behavior of reserves in response
to the sudden stop shock and the endowment shock, the magnitude differs substan-
tially. Figure 2.12 reports aggregate time series from the model using a solid line
and the data time series using a solid-dot line. Both model and data have constrast-
43
ing reserve movements depending on the source of the shock, with a low output
shock leading to an increase in reserves, while the sudden stop leads to a decrease
in reserves. The model adjusts reserves and debt much more sharply than data,
however.
Figure 2.12: Simulated Time Series

































This paper proposes a small open economy model that explains why emerging
markets simultaneously hold external debt and external reserves. Reserves may be
held simultaneously with debt even when their return is lower than the interest
rate on debt, because reserves are valuable as a vehicle of self-insurance. Two key
assumptions that differentiate the liquidity of reserves and debt, namely the sudden
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stop in the debt market and the maturity difference between reserves and debt, are
critical to generating this simultaneous holding.
The model generates simultaneous holding and frequent adjustments of re-
serves and debt, as observed in emerging markets’ data. The model also generates
responses to exogenous shocks that are qualitatively consistent with data. Reserves
decrease sharply when the external shock is a loss of access to foreign borrowing,
but do not necessarily decrease following a low endowment shock per se, provided
that the country retains access to foreign borrowing.
Although my model has desirable properties mentioned above, there is much to
be desired in terms of its quantitative fit. More importantly, the distinction between
reserves and debt is highly stylized. Important parameters related to reserves and
debt are also exogenously given. Microfounded characterization of the two markets
would enable us to explain the mechanism behind the differences between reserves
and debt, enriching the model. This is a topic for future research.
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Table 2.7: List of Sudden Stop Sample Periods


















Table 2.8: List of Output Decline Sample Periods













Credit Shocks, Patterns of Firm Financing, and Creditless Recoveries
3.1 Introduction
Firms’ responses to negative credit supply shocks have gained renewed interest
in the wake of the latest global financial crises. While there is a substantial litera-
ture that studies the implications of predetermined, structural financial frictions in
the existence of productivity shocks, shocks to financial frictions are only recently
beginning to be incorporated into theoretical modeling of the firm. This paper pro-
poses a dynamic model of the firm that explicitly incorporates credit shocks. After
documenting that banking crises are followed by stagnation in credit and that in-
vestment is financed less by debt and more by internal funds or equity at the time of
banking crises, I develop a dynamic model of the firm consistent with this finding.
In the model, the firm increases its reliance on retained earnings or equity issuance
in investment financing in response to a negative credit shock. Thus there is a sub-
stitution in the sources of financing. Comparing long-run distributions of the model
with and without credit shocks, this paper finds that first and second moments in
debt, equity payout, and capital are sensitive to inclusion of the credit shock. The
development of the model with credit shocks is the first contribution of the paper.
The literature on creditless recoveries mostly uses aggregate data and doc-
uments that both industrial and emerging market economies often recover from
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financial crises without an accompanying recovery in credit. While there is a broad
agreement on the existence of creditless recoveries, the reason for this phenomenon
is not settled yet. The modeling and empirical results in this paper emphasize the
role of credit shocks in generating creditless recoveries. Adding to the debate on
creditless recoveries is another contribution of this paper.
Empirically, I interpret banking crises as negative credit shocks to firms and
establish the following facts. First, using aggregate data I confirm that banking
crisis incidence leads to stagnant credit developments in subsequent years. Then at
the firm level, I show that firms located in countries that are experiencing bank-
ing crises tend to rely less on bank financing and more on other sources, such as
retained earnings or equity issuance. Using a firm-level survey for a broad range
of emerging market and developing economies in 2006-2009, I show that firms in
countries experiencing banking crises have a lower proportion of bank financing and
higher proportions of equity financing and owner’s self financing of fixed asset in-
vestment. This remains true after controling for credit-to-GDP ratio of countries
prior to banking crises.
Theoretically, I develop a dynamic firm model that features an exogenous
shock to credit supply and the firms’ substitution of sources of financing. The key
assumptions are: (i) there is a shock to the borrowing limit as well as a standard
productivity shock, (ii) equity financing is allowed but with a friction in the form of
a quadratic issuance cost. The model generates a substitution of financing sources in
response to a negative credit shock. The mechanism is the following. The shock leads
to a decline in current period debt capacity. The firm then attempts to maintain
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investment by resorting to internal funds. If the shock is sufficiently large that the
firm needs to issue equity, however, it reduces investment because of the equity
issuance cost.
Calculating the long-run distribution, I find that the firm is much more lever-
aged on average when it faces the productivity shock only. Volatilities of both debt
and equity payout is much higher when the firm faces both shocks. Equity pay-
out, debt issuance, and investment are all procyclical whether the firm incurs both
shocks or the productivity shock only. With both shocks, output is correlated more
positively with equity issuance and less with debt issuance, and is less positively cor-
related with investment. These results can be interpreted as the following. When
the credit shock exists, credit may not be available as needed. Knowing that, the
firm retains more earnings when the credit constraint is more relaxed, and draws
retained earnings down when the constraint is tighter. In contrast, the firm quickly
leverages itself and provides large equity payouts in the absence of credit shocks.
The model also generates creditless recoveries from financial crises in response
to an extended period of negative credit shocks. When new borrowing is curtailed
in the presence of relatively large current period debt and relatively large expected
productivity of next period capital, the firm determines it is worth incurring the
equity issuance cost to increase investment. While bank credit continues to be cur-
tailed because of the tight borrowing constraint, output can increase, supported by
the use of retained earnings or equity issuance. Because equity issuance is expensive,
however, when the firm needs to resort to equity financing, the level of investment
is lower than frictionless investment.
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I perform a set of sensitivity analyses in order to assess model properties. A
higher initial level of debt leads to a deeper recession initially. This is because the
higher debt repayment obligation in response to the negative credit shock is not
fully offset by the equity issuance, reflecting quadratic issuance cost. A smaller
fluctuation in the credit limit leads to a more gradual business cycle in general
and deemphasizes the creditless recovery pattern. Given that the loss of access to
foreign borrowing during crises is more severe for emerging market economies, this
last result is consistent with the stylized fact documented in Abiad et al. (2011)
that emerging markets and developing economies experience creditless recoveries
more frequently. Finally, the introduction of long-term bonds also results in more
gradual adjustments in the overall business cycle.
While the firm capital structure has been central to corporate finance research
at least since Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s seminal paper, only a limited number of
papers have explored the link between macroeconomic conditions and capital struc-
ture, such as Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006),
Chen (2010), and Covas and Den Haan (2010a). Most of these papers use U.S. data
and existing evidence is inconclusive on the nature of the relationship between the
capital structure and the business cycle. Even fewer papers consider the effect of
credit shocks on the capital structure. Jermann and Quadrini (2010) document using
aggregate data that equity payouts are procyclical while debt payouts are counter-
cyclical for U.S. firms at the aggregate level. They also develop a closed economy
model where credit shocks play an important role in capturing business cycle dy-
namics. While their model assumes an always binding constraint, I show that the
50
introduction of the credit shock results in the firm often conserving debt capacity
even in the periods of a relaxed credit limit. Covas and Den Haan (2010a) document
using firm level data that debt issuance is procyclical and that equity issuance is also
procyclical except for the largest firms. Regarding firms’ responses to credit shocks,
there is a string of recent empirical literature, with notable contributions includ-
ing Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil, and Villeagas-Sanchez (2009), Desai, Foley, and Forbes
(2008), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), and
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010). This literature typically concludes that an
exogenous shock to the supply of credit has a negative effect on the firms’ valua-
tion, investment and profit. In the theoretical corporate finance literature, there is
a growing set of papers that model firms’ dynamic financing and investment deci-
sions under uncertainty in productivity and in the presence of financial frictions.
The list includes Gomes (2001), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Hennessy and Whited
(2005), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), Bolton, Chen, and
Wang (2009), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), Rampini and Viswanathan
(2011), and Boileau and Moyen (2009). Papers in this strand of literature do not
model shocks to credit supply, however.
Creditless recoveries were first documented by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi
(2006) for emerging market economies. Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2008, 2009)
show that advanced economies also experience creditless recoveries. Abiad, Dell’Ariccia,
and Li (2011)’s work further studies the link between creditless recoveries and other
economic events, using both aggregate and sectoral data. At the aggregate level,
they find that a creditless recovery is more likely when a recession is associated
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with credit booms and banking crises. At the sectoral level, they show that indus-
trial sectors that inherently depend more on external financing tend to recover more
slowly from recession, suggesting the existence of impairment in financial interme-
diation. This paper’s focus on a binding external borrowing constraint is consistent
with their results. Its distinction is that it highlights the different composition of
financing sources at the firm level.
Theoretical models to replicate creditless recoveries have been limited. Biggs,
Mayer, and Pick (2010) show that the introduction of long-term debt can replicate
a creditless recovery around the time that credit growth suddenly decreases. They
make the point that growth in the flow of credit is closely correlated with growth
in output even if growth in the stock of credit is not. A key difference between
their model and mine is that while substitution between debt and internal financ-
ing/equity generates a creditless recovery in my model, such substitution is not
allowed in their model. Thus my model can generate a creditless recovery under
the standard assumption of one-period debt. In Dagher (2010), a negative shock to
trend productivity growth following Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), interacting with
an endogenous credit constraint, generates creditless recovery. The negative shock
decreases the value of the firm, tightening the credit constraint. As a result, the firm
deleverages toward the new steady state with less debt relative to output. Output
drops initially as the firm makes costly dividend reductions to finance investment.
However, the relevance of negative trend productivity shocks in the aftermath of fi-
nancial crises is debatable. In emerging markets, financial crises are often accompa-
nied by real depreciations, providing improved profit opportunities for the tradables
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sector. See Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez (2009) and Desai, Foley,
and Forbes (2008), for empirical evidence. At the aggregate level, Garcia-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010), and Chang and Fernandez (2010) question the impor-
tance of trend shocks in explaining emerging economies’ business cycle fluctuations.
My paper does not rely on shocks to productivity, however; in my model, a credit
shock alone generates a creditless recovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows stylized facts.
Section 3 describes the model and characterizes the firm’s policy analytically. Sec-
tion 4 solves the model numerically and describes the decisoin rule. Section 5 de-
scribes shows various simulation results, including ergodic distribution and creditless
recovery results. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Stylized Facts
3.2.1 Macro Data
Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li (2011) document that among different potential
explanations, banking crises are closely related to creditless recovery. I interpret
banking crises to be negative credit supply shocks and confirm that they are asso-
ciated with stagnant credit developments in subsequent years.
For this purpose, I summarize the relationship between the transition of output
and credit around the recession and recovery periods and measure how the existence
of banking crises affect it. I use output and credit for 1970-2007 for 124 countries
that encompass industrial, emerging market, and other developing economies. GDP
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deflator is used to convert nominal variables into real variables. The choice of
countries is dictated by data availability. All data are obtained from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics.
The bottom of the recession is defined as local minimum in detrended output
that is also lower than minus one standard deviation from trend. The method of de-
trending is Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 6.25 as recommended
for annual data by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). I define recovery periods to be 3 years
after the bottom of the recession. This practice follows Abiad Dell’Ariccia, and Li
(2011) and Braun and Larrain (2005). Credit is measured by bank credit to the
private sector (IFS line 22d). Identification of banking crisis follows Laeven and
Valencia (2010). They define a systemic banking crisis to start when the two con-
ditions are satisfied: 1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system,
2) significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses
in the banking system. They define the banking crisis to end in the year before
two conditions to hold: real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at
least two consecutive years. This procedure identifies 323 recessions and recoveries
episodes, 51 of which are associated with banking crises.
First, I simply compare the transition of credit to GDP ratio when recessions
are associated with banking crises and when they are not. A recession is considered
to be associated with banking crisis if there is a banking crisis within two years
prior to the bottom or at the time of the bottom of the recession. I take arithmetic
mean of credit to GDP ratio at the bottom of the recession and three years after
the bottom for both banking crisis subsample and non-banking crisis subsample.
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Table 3.1 show the results. Credit to output ratio is clearly more stagnant
when recessions are associated with banking crises than without them. While credit
to GDP ratios are not very different between banking crisis subsample and non-
banking crisis subsample at the bottom of the recessions, subsequent developments
differ significantly. Whereas credit to output ratio exceeds that at the bottom of
the crisis three years later, it stays below that at the bottom of the crisis when
the recessions are associated with banking crises. The credit deceleration during
Table 3.1: Credit to GDP ratio
Bottom 3 years later
With Banking Crisis 0.329 0.227
Without Banking Crisis 0.351 0.425
the banking crises can also be observed by tracking credit and output separately.
Figure 3.1 averages the detrended output and credit separately for downturns with
and without banking crises. While credit recovers in parallel with output after the
initial downturn in non-banking crises average, credit decelerates more rapidly than
output and stays stagnant in the aftermath with banking crises average. Note also
the boom in credit prior to downturn for with banking crises average. Looking at
country-specific series for selected emerging markets and industrial countries, figure
3.2 and figure 3.3 confirm that credit decelerates during the banking crises and
much more so than output, whether in emerging markets’ financial crises, industrial
countries’ financial crises of the late 2000’s, or the banking crisis in Japan in the
late 1990’s.
Next, I run a regression in order to measure how the banking crises are as-
sociated with subsequent credit developments. The regression specification is the
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Figure 3.1: Credit, Output and Banking Crisis (Aggregate)
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Figure 3.2: Credit, Output and Banking Crisis (Emerging Markets)
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Figure 3.3: Credit, Output and Banking Crisis (Industrial Economies)
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following.
crj,t = β0 + β1 ∗ bankingcrisisj,t−i + β2 ∗ crj,t−i + αj + εj,t (3.1)
where i = 1, 2, 3. Credit is measured alternatively by credit to output ratio and
HP-filtered deviation from trend. Current period credit is added to RHS given the
persistence in the credit time-series. I also add country-fixed effect αj for country
j.
Table 3.2: Macro Regression (cr=credit to GDP ratio, All countries)
(1) (2) (3)
F.creditoutput F2.creditoutput F3.creditoutput
bankingcrisis -0.0750 -0.0694 -0.0551∗
(-1.63) (-1.23) (-2.15)
creditoutput 0.702∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(124.45) (69.26) (44.01)
trough -0.107∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.0592∗∗
(-2.62) (-2.83) (-2.70)
cons 0.134∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(11.31) (16.05) (53.87)
N 3995 3871 3747
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.2 and table 3.3 show that the incidence of banking crisis has a negative
effect on credit developments in the next one to three years in general. When credit
development is measured by credit to output ratio, the coeffcient for banking crisis
dummy has a negative sign but significant only for the credit developments three
years later. When credit development is measured by HP-filtered deviation from
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Table 3.3: Macro Regression(cr=deviation from HP-filtered trend, All countries)
(1) (2) (3)
F.hp lnrealcredit F2.hp lnrealcredit F3.hp lnrealcredit
bankingcrisis -0.0649∗∗∗ -0.0619∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗
(-5.40) (-5.17) (-2.62)
hp lnrealcredit -0.0447∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(-2.76) (-16.24) (-14.51)
trough -0.00333 -0.00965 -0.00800
(-0.32) (-0.95) (-0.78)
cons 0.00546 0.00536 0.00245
(1.80) (1.79) (0.80)
N 3821 3697 3573
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
trend, the coefficient is negative and significant for all years. While current period
credit to output ratio has a positive effect on its future values, HP-filtered deviation
from trend has a negative effect on its future values. This is reasonable because
credit to output ratio is a measure of financial development with high persistence
while HP-filtered deviation from trend is business cycle movements.1
Table 3.4 and table 3.5 show the results when the sample is limited to emerging
market economies. The results are consistent with the results when all countries are
included but with the more pronounced effect of the banking crisis dummy, as the
coefficient for banking crisis dummy is negative and significant for all cases.
1I also run the pooled OLS, that is, without the fixed effect. The results are in line with the
results in the above baseline regression. Results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.4: Macro Regression (cr=credit to GDP ratio, Emerging Markets)
(1) (2) (3)
F.creditoutput F2.creditoutput F3.creditoutput
bankingcrisis -0.0377∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0872∗∗∗
(-3.73) (-5.38) (-5.98)
creditoutput 0.863∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(51.05) (33.45) (25.93)
trough -0.0277∗ -0.0253 -0.0196
(-2.02) (-1.44) (-1.00)
cons 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(9.51) (13.69) (16.31)
N 834 808 782
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.5: Macro Regression(cr=deviation from HP-filtered trend, Emerging Mar-
kets)
(1) (2) (3)
F.hp lnrealcredit F2.hp lnrealcredit F3.hp lnrealcredit
bankingcrisis -0.0963∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0780∗
(-3.08) (-4.31) (-2.41)
hp lnrealcredit -0.144∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(-4.11) (-6.32) (-4.52)
trough -0.0130 0.00999 0.00509
(-0.31) (0.24) (0.12)
cons 0.0153 0.0175 0.00911
(1.39) (1.59) (0.79)
N 807 781 755
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.2.2 Micro Data
A recovery of output without an accompanying recovery suggests the possibil-
ity of changes in sources of financing at the firm level. Here I investigate firm level
changes in financing sources around financial crises.
Data come from enterprise surveys of the World Bank. The World Bank con-
ducts a survey of business and investment environment that covers a broad range
of developing economies. For each country, the survey is designed to cover a sam-
ple of firms that matches the distribution in that country’s private sector. While
the survey asks questions in broad areas concerning investment environment, in-
cluding corruption, infrastructure, I focus on the questions regarding the sources of
investment financing.
I investigate the link between the incidence of banking crises and sources of
investment financing. I use all the enterprise surveys conducted between 2006-2009.
It includes 70 surveys, all for different countries. I run a pooled regression with the
following specification:
yi = β0 + β1 ∗ bankingcrisisi + β2 ∗ vector of controli + εi (3.2)
y is proportion of financing of fixed asset investment for five possible sources,
internal financing, bank financing, equity/owner’s fund financing, trade credit fi-
nancing, and other sources. Banking crisis dummy is the same as in the regression
for aggregate data above. bankingcrisisi = 1 if country in which firm i is located
was experiencing a banking crisis when the survey took place. I am interested in
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β1, the coefficient for the banking crisis dummy. A vector of control variables is
included in order to control for characteristics of the firm that can affect a firm’s
choice of financing. I include a categorical variable for firm size. A firm is defined
large if the number of employees is over 100, and defined to be medium-sized if it
is over 20 and smaller than 100, small if it is less than 20. Additionally, I include a
dummy variable for exporter. A firm is defined to be an exporter if the proportion
of export in total sales is larger than 10 percent. A dummy variable for banking
crises three years later is included in order to check for reverse causation from fi-
nancial structure to the incidence of banking crises. Because Laeven and Valencia’s
index is available only up to 2009, I constructed the index myself applying their
definition of the banking crises for any country-year pair missing from their index.
In one specification, I also include credit to output ratio in 2006, the starting year
in the sample period in order to control for financial development. Notice that no
country in the sample had banking crisis in 2006. Thus credit to output ratio in
2006 represents financial development in normal times, without being affected by
banking crisis.
From table 3.6, I find that banking crisis dummy is associated with higher
proportion of internal financing and equity/owners’ own financing, and lower pro-
portion of bank financing, in their financing of fixed asset purchase.2 The coefficients
are significant at the 1 percent level. This effect remains even after taking into ac-
count other factors that affect other factors that affect the sources of financing.
2Results for trade credit and other sources as regressand are omitted as β1 was not significant
in these regressions.
63
Table 3.6: Pooled Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
internal bank equity own internal bank equity own
bankingcrisis 10.09∗∗ -7.951∗∗∗ 4.204∗∗ 13.92∗∗∗ -9.805∗∗∗ 4.344∗∗
(3.24) (-5.68) (3.20) (4.10) (-6.49) (3.04)
postbankingcrisis -3.737 7.869∗∗∗ -2.876 8.651∗ -0.494 -4.199∗∗
(-1.12) (3.48) (-1.88) (2.38) (-0.19) (-2.61)
exp 0.0209 2.611 0.509 1.227 1.724 0.583
(0.01) (1.53) (0.65) (0.33) (0.91) (0.69)
small 19.23∗∗∗ -6.426∗∗∗ 1.759 19.40∗∗∗ -6.938∗∗∗ 1.948
(4.08) (-3.30) (1.40) (4.06) (-3.46) (1.48)
medium 5.994 -2.962 0.306 6.327 -3.544 0.191
(1.11) (-1.61) (0.26) (1.15) (-1.90) (0.16)
credoutput -46.82∗∗∗ 29.78∗∗∗ 3.574
(-6.36) (5.65) (1.60)
cons 46.48∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗∗ 2.603∗ 60.95∗∗∗ 13.67∗∗∗ 1.391
(9.95) (12.35) (2.31) (12.83) (6.56) (1.07)
N 18471 13789 18472 15790 12270 15791
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Coefficients for control variables also have correct signs and are typically significant.
Smaller firms tend to rely less on bank financing and more internal financing, and
firms in countries with higher credit to output ratio in 2006 tend to rely more on
bank financing and less on internal financing. Bank financing is closely associated
with future incidence of banking crisis in the version without credit to output ratio
in 2006. However, notice that most of the banking crisis incidence three years later
is a continuation from current year’s banking crisis, not present year’s high reliance
on bank financing causing a new banking crisis. This effect disappears in the version
that controls for credit to output ratio.
3.3 The Model
This section presents a dynamic model of the firm. It is characterized by (i)
shock to the debt limit, (ii) equity financing being allowed but only with quadratic
issuance cost.
3.3.1 Setup
The risk-neutral firm that lives indefinitely maximizes the presented discounted
value of dividends. Its production function is decreasing returns to scale in capital
(k), the only input. It finances capital investment either by current period cash
flow, non-state contingent debt (b), or equity (d if d < 0). Debt issuance is subject
to a stochastic collateral constraint and equity issuance is subject to a quadratic
cost. The firm also faces a standard productivity shock (z). The problem can be
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described recursively as the following.
V (k, b; z, φ) = max
k′,b′,d
{ϕ(d) + βEV (k′, b′; z′, φ′)} (3.3)
s.t.
d = zkα − F − (1 + r)b+ b′ + (1− δ)k − k′ (3.4)
ϕ(d) =

d if d ≥ 0
d− κd2 if d < 0
β is a fixed subjective discount factor of entrepreneurs. r is the interest rate
on the non-contingent bond, taken exogenously and fixed. I assume β(1 + r) < 1
in order to prevent the firm from accumulating sufficient saving and thus escaping
from binding borrowing constraint altogether. This assumption can be motivated
by tax advantages of debt issuance and used for example by Jeanne and Korinek
(2011). F is fixed cost of production, following Gomes (2001) and Gamba and
Triantis (2008). ′ denotes next period values. The firm pays dividend when d > 0
and issues equity when d < 0. Thus specification of ϕ(d) includes the quadratic
equity issuance cost. Equity issuance cost can be rationalized by transaction cost
or asymmetric information, and this specification is similar to Covas and Den Haan
(2010b) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011). The two exogenous shocks
are specified as follows:







• Exogenous shock to debt limit
b′ ≤ φk′ (3.6)
φ =

φh high debt limit
φl low debt limit
The productivity shock takes three values that follow Markov process. Unlike
Dagher (2010), there is no trend shock to productivity. The borrowing limit shock
takes two values that follow Markov process.
The collateral constraint is rationalized as the following. When the borrower
attempts to default, the lender can confiscate fraction φ of the physical capital whose
price is fixed at 1. The lender cannot confiscate current period cash flow, which is
fungible. As a result, the repayment obligation must not exceed ′. φ is known at
the time of the lending.
The shock to debt limit is assumed to be a purely exogenous process that is
orthogonal to the producivity shock. This assumption can be rationalized from the
perspective of the firm, which has to take as given the shock that happens at the
aggregate level. The model also abstracts from any tool to hedge against this credit
shock.
3.3.2 Characterization of Solution
First order conditions and envelope conditions are as follows, where η and µ




ϕ′(d) = η (3.7)
βEVk(k
′, b′, z′, φ′)− η + µφ = 0 (3.8)
βEVb(k
′, b′, z′, φ′) + η − µ = 0 (3.9)
Envelope conditions
Vb(k, b, z, φ) = −η(1 + r) (3.10)
Vk(k, b, z, φ) = η(αzk
α−1 + 1− δ) (3.11)




ϕ′(d′)(αz′k′α−1 + 1− δ)
]
+ µφ (3.12)
ϕ′(d) = β(1 + r)E [ϕ′(d′)] + µ (3.13)
µ (φk′ − b′) = 0 (3.14)
(3.12) and (3.13) are Euler equations for the choice of capital and debt, respec-
tively. (3.12) trades off marginal value of one unit of resource in the current period
and expected next period marginal value of additional capital both for production
and collateral purposes. (3.13) trades off marginal value of one unit of resource in
the current period and the sum of expected marginal cost of one unit of resources
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tomorrow and the shadow value of current period borrowing constraint. Intuitively,
current period marginal value of one unit of resource is higher when the borrowing
constraint is binding. (3.14) is the Kuhn-Tucker condition for the debt limit.
























αz′k′α−1 + 1− δ
)
+
cov(βϕ′(d′), αz′k′α−1 + 1− δ) + µφ
E [βϕ′(d′)]
(3.17)
Thus the cost of capital when financed by equity issuance is
E
(
αz′k′α−1 + 1− δ
)
+




3.3.2.1 Costless Equity Issuance
Let us abstract from equity issuance cost for a moment. Now the optimality
conditions and the budget constraint are the following.
1 = βE(αz′k′α−1 + 1− δ) + µφ (3.19)
1 = β(1 + r) + µ (3.20)
µ (φk′ − b′) = 0 (3.21)
d = zkα − F − b+ (1 + r)b′ + (1− δ)k − k′ (3.22)
Simplifying the model this way allows us to derive analytical results for the compo-
sition of sources of investment financing. I establish a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Always Binding Borrowing Constraint). When equity issuance is
costless, borrowing constraint is always binding.
Proof. Immediate from the assumption β(1 + r) < 1 and (3.20).
Lemma 2 (Optimal choice of capital). When equity issuance is costless, next
period capital is an increasing function of expected next period productivity and debt
limit parameter φ.















While the reason for the effect of expected productivity on the level of optimal
choice of capital is intuitively clear, the effect of the parameter of debt limit on
capital is related to the role of capital as collateral and the assumption β(1+r) < 1.
Because capital has the role of collateral, an increase in φ implies that the marginal
contribution of an additional unit of capital to the debt capacity is now larger. Given
the assumption β(1 + r) < 1, optimal borrowing constraint is always binding as
shown in Lemma 1. Thus the higher debt capacity necessarily beneficial to the firm.
Investment can be financed by either issuing new debt or dividend reduction/equity
issuance.
Using the lemmas above, I show the following proposition on the composition
of investment financing.
Proposition 7 (Credit shock and financing). When equity issuance is costless
and if the effect of credit shock on optimal capital is small, a negative shock in credit
with unchanged expected productivity leads to substitution of financing out of debt
into equity financing.
Proof. From (3.21) and Lemma 2,
b′ = φk′ (3.24)
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From (3.21), (3.22) and Lemma 2,
d = zkα − F − (1 + r)b+ (φ− 1)k′ + (1− δ)k (3.25)























The first terms on RHS are
∂b′
∂φ
= k′ ≥ 0 and ∂d
∂φ
= k′ > 0. If
∂k′
∂φ








Proposition 7 is key to understanding the substitution of financing sources
and the creditless recovery result. It shows that similar levels of investment can be
financed by different combinations of debt issuance and internal financing/equity
issuance, and that the combination is dependent on the initial states. Assuming the
effect of φ on k′ is negligible, expected next period productivity E(z′) and initial
capital k determines optimal investment. The firm finances the investment first by
borrowing to the limit, reflecting the assumption β(1+r) < 1. The net debt capacity
depends on the collateral constraint parameter φ and initial debt b. Dividend d
is obtained as the residual. If the external borrowing is not sufficient to finance
investment, the firm issues equity by setting d < 0. Suppose for example φ decreases
for given E(z′), k, b. Now net debt capacity is lower for the same investment
opportunity. Then the same level of investment is maintained by replacing the
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lower net borrowing by decreasing retained earnings (d > 0) or costlessly issue
equity (d < 0).
The firm borrows up to the debt limit because the cost of debt financing r is




the debt limit, the firm switches to equity financing. As equity financing increases
to finance investment, the Lagrange multiplier continues to increase (an increase
in effective interest rate) until it equals the intertemporal rate of substitution in
equilibrium.
I also establish the relationship between the productivity shock and the capital
structure. It turns out that the direction of debt issuance is clear but the direction
of equity issuance is ambiguous, depending on the effect of the change in capital on
debt capacity.
Proposition 8 (Productivity shock and financing). When equity issuance is
costless and if the productivity shock is persistent, an increase in productivity in-





> 0 from Lemma 1.
∂E(z′)
∂z













using Lemma 2 and (3.21).
An increase in productivity increases optimal next period capital because of
the persistence in productivity shock, which in turn increases debt capacity through
the collateral constraint. Debt increases to the new, higher collateral constraint,
financing the increase in capital.
3.3.2.2 Costly Equity Issuance
While abstraction from equity cost allows us to derive analytical results, this
assumption and its implication in lemma 2 is not necessarily realistic. In practice,
adjustment of capital is slow and capital is not adjusted to the level that reflects
the expected productivity every period. Thus I reintroduce the equity issuance
cost to the model to reflect this. 3 Nevertheless, the analytical results obtained in
proposition 7 are useful in understanding the numerical results below.
When equity issuance cost is added, capital choice reflects equity issuance cost
as well as expected productivity of capital. Next period capital is again determined
by the Euler equation (3.12), tradeoff between the marginal value of current period
additional unit of resource (the cost of dividend reduction or equity issuance) and
expected marginal value of next period capital, taking into account expected next
period equity issuance cost. In particular, costly equity issuance decrease the op-
3In practice, firms may face costs in other aspects of financial transactions. See Gamba and
Triantis (2008), Hennesey and Whited (2005), Bolton, Chen, and Wang(2009) for models with
multiple transaction costs.
74
timal investment. Thus the introduction of equity issuance cost leads to gradual
adjustment of capital in response to exogenous shocks.
The introduction of equity issuance cost would also imply that the firm may
not always exhaust its borrowing capacity. It is because accumulating excessive debt
would lead to high debt repayment and runs the risk of having to resort to costly
equity issuance next period. Next period debt is again determined by the Euler












− 1 = r and equilibrium is reached before the debt limit is reached.
3.4 Numerical Solution
I describe a decision rule based on numerical simulation. I assume one period
to be a year. Parameters are in table 3.7 and the transition matrices for the two
shocks are the following.



















Table 3.7: Calibration Parameters
Parameters Values Description
α 0.45 Degree of DRS, Gamba and Triantis (2008)




-10−3 β(1 + r) < 1
κ 0.05
φl, φh 0, 0.7 No new borrowing if φ = φl
zl, zm, zh 0.9, 1, 1.1
The details of the numerical method is the following.
• Given the non-linear, non-smooth nature of our model, we use modified policy
function iteration with the use of McQueen-Porteus error bound, as described
in Rust (1996).
• k × b = 51× 51 grids
• Grid for b is equal-spaced, grid for k is constructed as k∗(1−δ)i, i = 1, 2, ...51.
k satisfies zhk
α − (r + δ)k = 0. As described in Gomes (2001), k > k is not
economically profitable.
Figure 3.5 describes the decision rule when new borrowing is not allowed (φ =
0) and productivity is median (z = zm) in the current period.
First notice that debt limit is clearly binding throughout as shown in the
upper-left panel. Decision rules for other variables differ whether d ≥ 0 or d < 0.
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For high k and low b, the optimal decision leads to d ≥ 0. The firm sets k′
at a constant level that approximately reflects expected next period productivity
E(z′). As a result, investment is smaller for higher k and is invariant in b, as seen
in lower-right panel. Dividend is higher for larger k because of the higher current
period cash flow and lower need for investment and for smaller b because of the
higher current period cash flow, as seen in lower-left panel.
For low k and high b, k′ is smaller because now the optimal choice would entail
equity issuance as seen by d < 0 in the lower-left panel. Given the quadratic cost,
the higher the equity issuance, the marginal cost of financing is higher. Thus it is
lower for larger b, because the larger debt repayment obligation decreases current
period cash flow, requiring greater reliance on equity issuance. It is also lower for
smaller k, because the lower initial k and binding borrowing constraint implies that
more equity issuance is needed to get to the same k′.
Figure 3.6 describes the decision rule when new borrowing is allowed (φ = φh)
and productivity is median (z = zm) in the current period.
For high k and low b, the firm chooses not to exhaust its debt capacity. A
constant level of k′ is achieved by current period cash flow without resorting to equity
issuance. As explained above, borrowing to the limit would run the risk of costly
equity issuance next period. As a result, the firm chooses not to exhaust its debt
capacity even though β(1 + r) < 1. For low k and high b, however, the firm chooses
to exhaust its debt capacity and further issue equity. Given the equity issuance
cost, an increase in financing by debt issuance contains current period financing
cost, outweighing the expected cost of debt repayment next period. In this region,
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k′ is smaller as the level of equity issuance is larger because the quadratic equity
issuance cost implies that the financing cost is higher.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, I first generate ergodic distribution in order to explore the
relationship between output and equity payout, debt issuance, and investment. Then
I simulate the model to a particular series of shocks. I show that creditless recovery
can result as an optimal response by the firm to a persistent negative credit shock. I
also experiment with the symmetric shock of persistent, positive credit shock, akin
to credit boom. Subsequently I perform a set of sensitivity analyses and illustrate
how the model dynamics are affected when changing initial size of debt or when
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negative credit shock still allows for some debt in the balance sheet.
3.5.1 Ergodic Distribution
I document here the correlation between output and debt issuance, equity
issuance, and investment. I run a Monte-Carlo simulation of 100000 periods. Sim-
ulations are run with both shocks and with productivity shock only, fixing φ = φh,
in order to illustrate the effect of credit shock. Table 3.8 summarizes the results.
The firm is much more leveraged on average when it faces the productivity
shock only. Volatility of both debt and equity payout is much higher when the
firm faces both shocks. In terms of correlation with output, equity payout, debt
issuance, and investment are all procyclical whether the firm incurs both shocks or
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productivity shock only. With both shocks, output is correlated more with equity
issuance and less with debt issuance. It is also less correlated with investment.
Table 3.8: Ergodic Distribution
Both shocks Productivity shock only
Mean equity payout 1.17 1.07
Std equity payout 0.65 0.35
Mean Debt 2.16 4.86
Std Debt 0.90 0.10
Mean Capital 8.24 8.35
Std Capital 0.53 0.42
corr. with equity payout 0.27 0.23
corr. with debt issuance 0.04 0.33
corr. with investment 0.15 0.39
The contrasting behavior can be highlighted by comparing sample time-series
starting from the same state, as shown in figure 3.7. Red lines denote series with
both shocks. The firm without the credit shock quickly leverages itself and pay out
dividends. Also note that the firm chooses not to exhaust its borrowing capacity in
the presence of credit shock.
These results can be interpreted as the following. When credit shock exists,
credit may not be available as needed. Knowing that, the firm retains more earnings
when credit constraint is more relaxed, and draw it down when the constraint is
tighter. In contrast, the firm quickly leverages itself and provides large equity payout
in initial periods in the absence of credit shocks.
Figure 3.8 shows frequency distribution for equity payout, debt, and capital.
Red lines denote distribution with both shocks. It confirms that debt is lower on
average and more disperse if there are credit shocks. Dividend is never negative
if there is no sudden stop. Without credit shock, the firm can avoid costly equity
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Figure 3.7: Both shocks v. productivity shock only: sample time-series from same
state























Figure 3.8: Frequency plot
























issuance. With credit shock, dividend is much more disperse and includes nega-
tive values occasionally. Capital takes only a few values, reflecting relatively low
persistence of productivity shock.
3.5.2 Simulated time series path
I consider a particular series of credit shocks that intend to replicate the exter-
nal financing environment that firms face in the aftermath of the financial crises. In
the scenario that extend for 8 periods,the firm incurs loss of access to new borrowing
in period 2, which continues for 5 periods. Productivity stays at z = zm through-





α− 1 , optimal level of capital for
frictionless world and z = zm. Initial debt is set at the debt limit with φ = φh. The
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Figure 3.9: Credit Shock Time Series

































results are shown in figure 3.9.
On impact of the shock in t = 2, the firm is forced to repay a large amount
of debt, financed by equity issuance and sale of capital. Subsequently from t = 3 to
t = 6, the firm makes positive investment, financed by equity issuance or lowering
dividend payment. In t = 7, the firm regains access to new borrowing and starts to
accumulate debt again.
This experiment makes two points. First, ouput can recover without credit
provision, by resorting to equity financing or retained earnings. Second, the recovery
is gradual because the equity financing is costly. These results are consistent with
empirical evidence in Claessens et al. (2008) and Abiad et al. (2011) that point to
creditless recovery taking place but recovery being weaker.
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Figure 3.10: Credit Boom Time Series


































Now let us consider an experiment contrary to sudden stop, that of credit
boom. The firm starts with no debt capacity, but will obtain debt capacity between
t = 2 and t = 5. In t = 6 and t = 7, the firm again faces lower debt limit. The firm
starts with positive saving. In figure 3.10, the firm quickly accumulates debt and
allocates it as dividend. Because there is no change in productivity and therefore
no change in expected productivity, investment does not change.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection I compare time series for different parameters in order to
assess model properties. In particular, I experiment with different initial level of
debt and different volatility in borrowing limit, and change in maturity.
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3.5.3.1 Changes in Initial Level of Debt
High leverage often precedes financial crisis, as documented in Tornell and
Westermann (2005), Mendoza and Terrones (2008). Furthermore, creditless recov-
ery is frequently associated with preceding credit booms, as documented in Abiad,
Dell’Arricia, and Li (2011). At the firm level, high leverage is associated with lower
investment (Bleakley and Cowan (2009))
In order to explore the effect of high leverage on model dynamics, I set φh = 1
instead of benchmark case φh = 0.7, while maintaining everything else as in the
benchmark case. Figure 3.11 shows the result. Overall dynamics are similar to the
benchmark case. Initial deleveraging is more pronounced than the benchmark case.
Because of increasing equity issuance cost in the level of issuance, the higher debt
repayment is not fully offset by equity issuance, leading to lower investment than in
the benchmark case. Subsequent investment broadly parallels the benchmark case.
Output recovery is slower as a result.
3.5.3.2 Smaller Credit Shock
Abiad et al. (2011) document that creditless recovery is more frequent in
emerging and developing economies than in industrial economies. It is also widely
believd that the capital market imperfections are more extreme in the emerging
markets and developing economies than in the industrial economies. Here I decrease
the fluctuation of borrowing limit from φh = 0.7, φl = 0 to φh = 0.7, φl = 0.3.
Figure 3.12 shows the result. Smaller gap between φh and φl implies that
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Figure 3.11: Credit Shock Time Series (larger initial debt)


































forced adjustment is smaller. Thus the response is more gradual compared with the
benchmark case. Unlike the benchmark case, the economy never has to repay all its
debt even after an extended period of negative credit shocks. As a result, the debt
to output ratio decreases much less. There is no discernible pattern of creditless
recovery. This result is consistent with Abiad et al. (2011)’s empirical evidence.
3.5.3.3 Introduction of long-term bonds
Benchmark case made a standard assumption of one-period debt. However,
in practice a substantial fraction of debt has long-term maturity. Here I introduce
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Figure 3.12: Credit Shock Time Series (Smaller Credit Shock)

































long-term debt by modifying the borrowing constraint of the model (3.6) to:
b′ ≤ max[φk′, (1− λ)b] (3.30)
λ is a proportion of the principal of the existing debt that needs to be repaid each
period. Setting λ = 1 reduces the model to standard one-period debt. This is a
simple way to introduce variation in maturity while maintaining tractability of the
model. See Komatsuzaki (2011) and reference therein for other examples. A smaller
λ implies a shock to the new borrowing is mitigated because a debter is not forced
to repay all existing debt.
Figure 3.13 compares the transition with the benchmark case for λ = 0.5.
Overall dynamics is smoother and more gradual than the benchmark case. The
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negative credit shock does not force the firm to repay debt all at once. Debt to out-
put ratio slightly increases after the initial credit shock in fact, before the sequence
of negative shocks decreases it. Because of the smaller repayment, the firm has more
cash flow in t = 2 than in the benchmark case. Thus it does not have to decrease
capital as sharply as the benchmark case. This, one the other hand, means that
the turnaround investment and output is delayed compared with bencmark case be-
cause of the decreasing return to scale assumption. In t = 4, the decrease in capital
increases expected next period marginal productivity of capital sufficiently. Simul-
taneously, the continuous develeraging decreases the burden of debt repayment and
decreases financing cost of investment. The firm gradually increases its investment,
supported by equity issuance. This again leads to creditless recovery. The creditless
recovery happens only in the latter part of the simulation periods.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between credit shocks and firm fi-
nancing patterns. It develops a parsimonious theoretical model in which the firm
increases its reliance on retained earnings or equity issuance in response to a neg-
ative credit shock. The substitution mechanism in the model is supported by an
empirical section that shows that investment is financed less by debt and more by
internal fund/equity at the time of banking crises.
Empirically, this paper shows that the incidence of banking crises are associ-
ated with stagnant credit developments in the following years at the aggregate level.
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Figure 3.13: Credit Shock Time Series(Long-term Debt)


































It also shows using the firm data that the existence of banking crisis is associated
with higher use of internal fund and equity financing and lower use of bank fund for
financing investment.
Theoretically, this paper proposes a dynamic model of the firm that is consis-
tent with the above empirical facts. Key assumptions are: (i) shock to the borrowing
limit as well as standard productivity shock, (ii) equity financing is allowed but with
a friction in the form of quadratic issuance cost.
This paper compares long-run distributions of the model with and without
credit shocks. It finds that The firm is much more leveraged and has lower equity
ayout on average when it faces the productivity shock only. In terms of correla-
tion with output, equity payout, debt issuance, and investment are all procyclical
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whether the firm incurs both shocks or productivity shock only. With both shocks,
output is correlated more with equity issuance and less with debt issuance. It is
also less correlated with investment.
In response to an exogenous shock that curtails new bank borrowing, the firm
chooses to use current period cash flow or issue equity in order to fund investment
when it expects next period productivity to be high. This way the firm can expand





Reserves Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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A.2 Equilibrium conditions
For b = bh the problem is the following.













The first-order conditions are the following. µh, ψh, ηha, ηhb are Lagrange








′, b′, y′) + (1− Phl)V h1 (a′, b′, y′)f(y′, y)dy′
}








′, b′, y′) + (1− Phl)V h2 (a′, b′, y′)f(y′, y)dy′
}
− µh + ηhb − ψh = 0 (33)
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The envelope conditions are the following:
V h1 (a, b, y) = (1 + r
s)µh (34)
V h2 (a, b, y) = −(1 + r)µh (35)
For b = 0, the problem, first-order conditions, and envelope conditions are
the following. µl, ψl, ηla, ηlb are Lagrange multipliers for (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5),
respectively.



















′, b′, y′) + (1− Pll)V h1 (a′, b′, y′)f(y′, y)dy′
}








′, b′, y′) + (1− Pll)V h2 (a′, b′, y′)f(y′, y)dy′
}
− µl + ηlb − ψl = 0 (38)
V l1 (a, b, y) = (1 + r
s)µl (39)
V l2 (a, b, y) = −(1 + r)µl + ψl(1− λ) (40)
Combining the above optimality conditions, we obtain the following.






















i = h, l is the current debt limit. (41) and (42) are the Euler equations for saving
and debt, respectively. For these equations to be consistent with each other, we
have the following observations.
(41) and (42) imply
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